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AJAY K. MEHROTRA
Forging Fiscal Reform:
Constitutional Change, Public Policy,
and the Creation of Administrative
Capacity in Wisconsin, 1880–1920
At the turn of the twentieth century, Wisconsin, like many northern
industrial states, faced a profound fiscal challenge. As one concerned
citizen succinctly explained, “The two great administrative problems before
our people at this time are, first, the control of corporate wealth, and, sec-
ond, the establishment of a rational system of taxation.”
1
The large-scale
structural pressures created by the rise of corporate capitalism and the
decline of an obsolete tax system forced all levels of government to re-
examine the substance and administration of their fiscal policies. At the
state and local level, many governments addressed the mismatch between
the increasing demand for state services and the declining supply of rev-
enue by turning to new levies and innovative forms of administration.
In confronting the impending fiscal dilemmas, Wisconsin was a leader
in forging fiscal reforms. Political activists, lawmakers, and other govern-
ment actors in the Badger State led a turn-of-the-century property tax
revolt when they sought to replace the aging, locally administered general
property tax with a graduated income tax managed by a centralized,
administrative bureaucracy. After a long and arduous process, reformers
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were able in 1911 to enact the first effective state-level income tax that
would soon become the model for other states and even the national
government. Although the income tax did not become a wholesale
replacement for the general property tax, its limited success was achieved
in part because tax reformers overcame numerous institutional barriers as
they helped promote a more equitable and effective distribution of fiscal
burdens. By confronting the entrenched power of political parties, state
constitutional constraints, and cultural resistance to centralized authority,
activists and politicians established an institutional beachhead for the
subsequent development of a new fiscal order—one that was guided not
simply by the need for greater revenue but by concerns for equity and
economic and social justice.
Because the campaign to use progressive income taxes as a complete
replacement for the property tax was ultimately unsuccessful, the turn-of-
the-century tax reform movement reveals both the limits and accomplish-
ments of fiscal reform. The inability of Wisconsin’s lawmakers to relinquish
their reliance on the property tax was perhaps a missed opportunity during
a unique period of political plasticity. But the income tax campaign did
initiate the incremental process of diminishing Wisconsin’s dependence on
property taxes. Indeed, by the end of the 1920s, the income tax generated
a significant portion of the state’s revenues. Still, the income tax did not
become the dominant source of subnational government revenue
throughout the country, as some reformers had envisioned. Over time, as
part of the institutional compromise of federalism, different levels of
American governance divided the sources of tax revenue. By the end of
the twentieth century, the federal government would come to control most
income tax revenue, state governments would rely on a combination of
sales and income taxes, and local governments would be left primarily with
property taxes.
2
Despite the limited success of the income tax, the early twentieth-
century tax reform campaign had a durable impact on the administration
of public finance. Since the property tax was embedded in the nineteenth-
century state-level system of “courts and parties,” activists seeking to make
taxation more transparent, rational, routinized, and fair inevitably had to
confront the local process of tax administration.
3
In challenging the
dominance of the locally administered property tax, reformers wrestled
power away from local political parties and consolidated it in the hands of
elite professional experts. They attempted, in the process, to alter the
popular and cultural perception of local self-government, which at the 
time valorized local administration by party officials as an established part
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of the nation’s republican traditions. This essay investigates how and why
tax reformers in Wisconsin were able to help build the administrative
capacity to levy new forms of taxation but were unable to replace the
property tax with a progressive tax on income.
Other studies of state and local tax reform during the Gilded Age and
Progressive Era have had little to say about the peculiar persistence of the
property tax, and even less to say about Wisconsin’s administrative
achievements. Those scholars who have examined the political history of
Wisconsin’s tax reforms have generally elided the development of
administrative capacity; instead, they have depicted the new tax laws and
policies as the consequences of newly formed interest groups or coalitions
that sought to recalibrate tax burdens by increasing taxes on corporations
and wealthy individuals.
4
By contrast, others have explained the
emergence of the Wisconsin income tax as an apolitical solution to the
technical problems posed by the dysfunctional property tax.
5
Scholars who
have explored state and local tax reforms more generally have frequently
noted the persistence of the property tax, but given their broad compara-
tive analysis they have not attempted to explain why particular tax policies
within specific states crystallized or wasted away.
6
In analyzing the qualified achievements of the Wisconsin income tax
movement, this essay provides a glimpse at a larger narrative about the
dramatic structural transformation in American public finance that
occurred at the turn of the twentieth century. The tax reforms that were
enacted in Wisconsin and other northern industrial states not only presaged
changes at the national level; they also reflected a broader and more fun-
damental revolution in American state-society relations. Although gradu-
ated income taxes, both at the national and state level, had modest
beginnings—with low marginal rates and high exemption levels affecting
only the wealthiest of taxpayers—they were, as the legal historian Lawrence
Friedman has noted, “the opening wedge for a major transformation of
American society.”
7
By reallocating the burdens of financing a modern
industrial democracy, this new form of fiscal governance was concerned
with redefining the meaning of modern citizenship, facilitating a funda-
mental change in existing political arrangements, and underwriting the
emergence of the modern American liberal state.
The Roots of the Fiscal Challenges
The fiscal challenges that Wisconsin and other states faced were
rooted in a dual set of modern pressures. On one side, broad social
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dislocations wrought by the accelerating forces of industrialization,
urbanization, and mass migration created an overwhelming demand for
government goods and services. On the other side, the growing ineffec-
tiveness of the property tax and the constitutional limits on government
debt constrained the supply of public funds. Together, these twin forces
compelled policymakers in Wisconsin and many other states to confront
the increasing importance of public finance. While some sought to limit the
increasing size of state governments, many others attacked the anachronistic
property tax and searched for alternative forms of financing.
Scholars have long noted how demographic pressures became more
pronounced in the United States during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
8
Wisconsin was representative of this trend. Between
1880 and 1920, its population doubled; the annual value of the state’s total
manufactured products increased fourteenfold; and its leading city,
Milwaukee, jumped from the nineteenth to the twelfth largest in the
nation.
9
Although local governments, which had greater flexibility in using
debt, accounted for most infrastructure investments, the state’s spending on
social programs increased at a steady pace along with such accelerated
growth.
10
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Wisconsin’s
expenditures on education and charitable and penal institutions grew
dramatically. Per capita spending on education alone nearly doubled from
1880 to 1900.
11
Spending on institutions for dependents gave way to public
goods such as roads and highways in the early twentieth century, but the
overall demand for public resources continued unabated.
12
While increased spending exerted demand-side pressures on
Wisconsin’s treasury, the state also faced a shrinking supply of public funds.
Like most other northern industrial states, Wisconsin relied heavily on the
general property tax for state and local revenue.
13
The general property tax
was meant to apply equally to real and personal property, to tangible as well
as intangible forms of wealth. The owners of land, buildings, machinery,
and other forms of real property were to be treated the same as those who
held their wealth in personal property such as stocks and bonds, or income
from professional salaries and fees.
14
With the rise of finance capitalism and the growing prevalence of
corporate securities, however, personal property became increasingly
intangible and more difficult to assess. Moreover, professional salaries
became more common and conspicuous.
15
Consequently, tax experts
throughout the country proclaimed that the property tax discriminated
against the poor, particularly farmers, whose limited holdings were
corporeal and in plain sight. The urban rich and affluent, by contrast,
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held much of their wealth in the form of cash salaries or intangible
personal property like securities, mortgages, and other financial assets,
which often escaped assessment. “The omission of this kind of property
from assessment,” the Wisconsin tax commission proclaimed in 1898, “is
perhaps the most noticeable of all defects in the administration of our
tax laws.”
16
Other tax experts concurred. As Edwin R. A. Seligman, a
leading tax expert, noted in 1890, the general property tax “pressed
hardest on those least able to pay.”
17
Even before lawmakers and policy analysts took up the calls for an
income tax, citizens throughout the state acknowledged how the existing
property tax implicated regional and class differences. Wealthy urban
citizens and affluent farmers, who were often noninstitutional holders of
mortgages—or what were referred to as “credits” at the time—were able to
shift their fair share of financing the public sector. As the Milwaukee state
senator F. W. von Cotzhausen observed, “Large fortunes, invested in credits
and securities, escape taxation altogether because not visible or tangible,
thus throwing increased burden upon others.”
18
Reformers in other states
like Minnesota attempted to address the taxation of intangibles by lowering
the rates on such property, but the limited success of taxing classified prop-
erty at different rates and constitutional restrictions requiring uniformity of
rates seemed to deter Wisconsin tax experts.
19
The inherent defects of a tax on personal property may have appeared
obvious. But for many reformers the greater deficiency was the assessment
process. In most states, locally elected or appointed, part-time assessors
calculated and collected the general property tax. Charged with the
responsibility of collecting the levy from their neighbors, local assessors had
neither the expertise nor the gumption to determine accurately the value
of personal intangible property such as stocks, bonds, mortgages, and other
financial assets. Furthermore, as officials beholden to the authority of local
political parties, assessors were exposed to the disciplining efforts of party
bosses.
20
Even though Wisconsin, following the lead of Indiana and other
states, had shifted the assessment process from local to county boards as
early as 1868, the lack of a professionally trained group of supervisors
seemed only to exacerbate the political nature of the tax. Not only did
county boards regularly overassess the forest lands of nonresidents, but
they also allegedly shifted property tax liabilities from town to town
depending upon the ethnic composition of the different municipalities.
“Under a purely local system of administration,” the Harvard economist
Charles J. Bullock explained, “there never was and never will be a generally
satisfactory assessment of either income or property.”
21
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For many tax experts, the political nature of property tax assessments,
and not the self-interest of taxpayers, created a culture of deceit. “The
American taxpayer is the most maligned creature in all the annals of
fiction,” proclaimed T. S. Adams, a University of Wisconsin political econ-
omist and a member of the state tax commission. “He has been compared,
confused and used synonymously with the liar. As a matter of fact, when
confronted with an equitable tax and a fearless assessor, he is amazingly
honest,” wrote Adams. “It is the locally elected property assessor, bent on
conciliating voters and on keeping his own underpaid job, who has demor-
alized the American property tax and made it in the past a by word for
chicanery, inefficiency and inequality.”
22
It was not only the power of local politics that embedded the prop-
erty tax in the nineteenth-century system of state and local public
finance. Just as the federal courts complemented the power and policies
of nineteenth-century national political parties, state courts and consti-
tutions provided similar support at the subnational level. The state con-
stitutional clauses that required “uniform” property taxes and limited a
state’s debt obligations were meant initially to be checks on the power
of state legislatures, and as ersatz proxies for equal taxation.
23
But over
time, as the inadequacies of the property tax and the increased demand
for public goods and services strained government resources, these con-
stitutional provisions became institutional obstacles for those lawmakers
and reformers seeking to redistribute fiscal burdens and change the
structure and activities of state and local governments.
24
Wisconsin’s constitutional uniformity clause, which was adopted in
1848, was a pithy one sentence: “The rule of taxation shall be uniform
and taxes shall be levied upon such property as the legislature shall pre-
scribe.”
25
Yet, this language, as interpreted by the Wisconsin courts, did
not provide much relief from the arbitrary and capricious application of
politically motivated property tax assessments.In principle, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court did intervene to prevent “errors of judgment and mis-
takes of fact” made by local assessors, but as long as such errors were
“exceptional and happen in good faith, not affecting the principle or the
general equality of the assessment,” they were deemed constitutional.
Indeed, only the most overt and egregious types of malfeasance compelled
the court to strike down an assessment process; for example, when all the
lands in a particularly diverse township were assessed at precisely the
same value.
26
The state constitution and the court’s rulings compounded the
institutional obstacles that stood before reformers. As a result, state and
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local governments were being squeezed from all sides. An increased
demand for public services, a declining tax base, and a dysfunctional and
legally entrenched system of tax assessment all posed serious fiscal
challenges, forcing lawmakers and activists to search for alternative
means of financing.
The Constitutional Campaign for an Income Tax
If broad structural forces were the fundamental driving force behind the
creation of the first workable state income tax, the triggering event for
the new law seemed to be the Panic of 1893. The ensuing economic
slump of the 1890s led to the formation of a unique political coalition
that challenged the conservative core of Wisconsin’s Republican Party.
The fiscal dilemma and the economic depression, as David Thelen has
shown, united “workers and businessmen, foreign born and native born,
Populist and Republicans, drinkers and abstainers, Catholics and
Protestants” behind a whole host of political, social, and economic
reforms, including tax reform, which “was the most popular and powerful
of the state’s reform movements.” The emergence of this diverse group of
engaged citizens came at a time when political arrangements throughout
the nation were changing dramatically, as a more fragmented, issue-
focused form of politics began to eclipse the traditional power of political
parties.
27
Although it would be several years before the state constitution was
amended to allow for a graduated income tax, the incremental process of
tax reform began toward the end of the depression, when the legislature
created a temporary tax commission in 1897. Kossuth K. Kennan, a
Milwaukee railroad lawyer, had long advocated the need for a state tax
commission to rationalize the various state and local tax laws. As one of the
members of the first temporary tax commission, Kennan helped identify
the myriad problems that plagued the property tax. He and his colleagues
also made several recommendations addressing the assessment process,
including a proposal for placing the supervision of tax administration in the
control of objective, nonelected, professional experts.
28
A graduated income tax was not among the first tax commission’s
recommendations in 1898. But four years later, after the election of
Governor Robert La Follette Sr., the first permanent tax commission led
the charge for an income tax as a method to combat the vexing problem
of taxing intangible personal property and professional salaries. One of the
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leading supporters for an income tax within La Follette’s progressive
Republican wing was Nils P. Haugen, a lawyer and former U.S.
congressman, who became one of the first members of the permanent tax
commission. Known as La Follette’s “ first lieutenant,” Haugen repre-
sented the Norwegian base of La Follette’s progressive coalition.
29
Working
closely with Haugen was T. S. Adams, the University of Wisconsin politi-
cal economist who would go on to become a leading, internationally
known tax expert. The Haugen-Adams collaborative relationship
reflected the unique institutional links that existed in Madison between
the state legislature and the flagship university campus, a link that
explained why Wisconsin was one of the nation’s leading laboratories of
democratic reforms. Contemporaries described this distinctive reciprocal
relationship as the “Wisconsin Idea”—the belief that social scientific
knowledge ought to be used to solve the problems and improve the lives
of the community’s citizens.
30
Together with Adams and others, Haugen spearheaded the campaign
for a state income tax as a solution to the inequities of the property tax.
As a lawyer, Haugen understood that if the income tax was to become a
serious replacement for the property tax, the proper constitutional
foundations needed to be established. While tax reformers at the national
level were contemplating a constitutional amendment to secure a federal
income tax, Wisconsin’s political activists had already begun the process
of changing their state constitution to permit progressive income taxes. By
mobilizing those most disgruntled with the property tax, especially among
his own agrarian constituency, Haugen was able to compel the state legis-
lature in 1903 to consider a constitutional amendment permitting state
income taxation. Approved as part of a larger tax overhaul, which
included the adoption of a graduated inheritance tax and modifications to
the system of corporate taxes, the amendment called for a simple addition
to the uniformity clause permitting progressive income taxes.
31
It read:
“Taxes may also be imposed on incomes, privileges and occupations,
which taxes may be graduated and progressive, and reasonable exemp-
tions may be provided.”
32
After some initial technical setbacks, the
income tax amendment was overwhelmingly approved in a 1908
statewide referendum by a margin of 2 to 1.
33
Wisconsin’s pioneering role in tax reform came at the height of the
social and political fervor of the Progressive Era. The income tax was
thus part of a broader movement for democratic reforms that included
direct primary elections, the referendum and initiative, and protective
labor legislation and conservation laws. Many of these reforms required
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constitutional changes. With the approval of consecutive progressive
governors, lawmakers and citizens in the early decades of the century
frequently amended the Wisconsin constitution. Between 1910 and
1930, the state constitution was amended fifteen times during each
decade, far more than in previous or subsequent decades. These numer-
ous modifications illustrated how legislators and citizens during these
years viewed the constitution not simply as a rigid restraint on state
action, but rather as a flexible democratic institution reflecting changing
political and social values.
34
Building Administrative Capacity
Despite the straightforward success of the income tax amendment, reformers
and policy experts acknowledged that amending the constitution was only
the beginning of the struggle for a graduated income tax. Politicians like
Haugen and tax experts like Adams soon realized that an income tax could
become reality only if the machinery of tax administration itself underwent
a type of constitutional change. Income would be no easier to assess than
intangible personal property, and thus as long as the assessment and super-
vision process was left in the hands of local political officials there was little
hope of effectively raising revenue in an equitable manner with an income
tax. Activists therefore advocated the centralization of tax assessment at
the state rather than the county level. In what was perhaps the boldest of
reforms, they sought to remove tax administration from the ambit of local
political machines and place that responsibility onto the state’s growing
cadre of bureaucratic experts.
The creation of a centrally administered income tax was not simply
a technical issue for many reformers; it implicated broader concerns
about the democratic roots and consequences of tax reform. During the
legislative hearings discussing the first income tax law, Adams explained
how the prevailing ineffective property tax system eroded public confi-
dence and trust in democratic institutions, and hence adversely affected
the state treasury as well as the larger body politic. “The statute under
which taxation is now carried on is really class legislation, molded in
favor of the possessors of intangible property,” Adams declared. “The
smaller property-owners bear the whole burden.” With this discrepancy
in place “the tax system is founded on evasion, undervaluation, and
perjury.” Responding to charges that graduated income taxes were a form
of “creeping socialism,” Adams informed lawmakers that the inefficacy of
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the property tax system created an environment that compelled citizens
to question their faith in democratic institutions. “We are all engaged in
the scramble,” Adams charged. “Democracy is failing in one of the most
important phases of government—that of collecting the necessary
revenues in an equitable manner. It might be termed a great conspiracy,
in which democracy corrupts its citizens and, in turn, is corrupted.” Seen
in this light, the move to a centrally administered income tax, Adams
concluded, was not a socialist measure, but rather an “ultraconservative”
return to the roots of American democracy.
35
Adams's earlier defense of the honest American taxpayer together
with his support for the centralization of bureaucratic control was indeed a
strange mix of faith in democratic participation and expert administration.
Using centralized, bureaucratic administration to defend the honesty and
civic values of the quotidian taxpayer was an unusual rhetorical move, but
one that resonated with the times. Progressivism itself seemed to contain
this, and other, seemingly inherent tensions between democratic decision-
making and expert management.
36
Some tax experts, like Adams, sincerely—perhaps even naively—
believed that solving the administrative problems of the tax assessment
process was more than half the battle; that once thoroughgoing civil-
service reforms had been implemented, and politics had been divorced
from the assessment process, the bureaucratic autonomy would exist to
allow the state income tax to replace the property tax.
37
Neither Adams
nor Haugen, however, mentioned that the administrative reforms they
proposed necessarily meant that a great deal of political and economic
power would also be bestowed upon the state tax commission, on which
they both served. For Adams the social scientist, the fortification of fiscal
power was an inexorable function of centralization; for Haugen, it was a
political opportunity to protect the interests of his own constituency. The
latter fact did not escape the legislators who opposed the income tax.
Overcoming Popular Resistance to Centralized Authority
In building the necessary administrative capacity, reformers also faced
popular resistance to the consolidation of bureaucratic authority. The tra-
ditional American political and legal culture of self-governance and com-
munal sovereignty played a key role in framing the debates surrounding
administrative tax reform. Haugen, in particular, ran across this type of
resistance with many of his constituents. In an extended correspondence
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with H. S. Wilson, the president of the State Normal School in River Falls,
Haugen expressed his views on the local control of tax assessments. Over
time, Haugen had persuaded Wilson that income was theoretically the
proper measure of taxation, and that any new state levy could benefit
localities through intergovernmental transfers. Nevertheless, Wilson con-
tinued to resist any administrative tax reforms. “I am not yet ready to turn
over local taxation with all of its glaring evils to some centralized author-
ity,” wrote Wilson in the summer of 1910. “This is not in harmony with
the American Spirit.”
38
In response, Haugen acknowledged that “the sentiment in favor of
what Americans believe is local self-government is the greatest objection
that we have to meet in order to improve our taxation system.” But what
Americans’ believed to be self-government was, in Haugen’s estimation,
completely illusory. “There is absolutely no choice in an American town,
city or village as to the kind of government under which the local
community desires to live,” wrote Haugen. “The jacket is cut and fitted
by central authority and the local community must wear it no matter how
great the misfit may be.” Those who held on to the outdated nineteenth-
century notion of local self-government amid the dramatic changes of
twentieth-century industrial capitalism, Haugen argued, undermined
rather than enforced the rule of law.
39
What Haugen feared even more than the deterioration of law,
however, was the notion of American exceptionalism that undergirded the
unyielding support for local self-government reflected in Wilson’s letters.
Wilson’s invocation of the “American Spirit ” was merely representative of
a much broader concern among provincial officials over the loss of local
control, and thus Haugen felt compelled to correct this misconception.
Using Germany as a comparative example, Haugen provided Wilson with
a detailed quantitative analysis of how German public finance was, in fact,
saturated with local self-government. From this Haugen concluded that
“the local self-government which we enjoy is the privilege of ignoring the
law—setting it aside—and leaving the offender to go unpunished or
unrebuked.” If this is what Wilson meant by self-government, Haugen
sardonically remarked, “there is probably less self-government in Germany
than in the United States.”
40
In challenging the traditional reliance on local authority, reformers
like Haugen were also using tax policy to forge a new and broader sense
of citizenship. Even though local governments were still the source of
most public spending, Haugen believed that, in an increasingly interde-
pendent social world, individual citizens needed to recognize that they
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had obligations and responsibilities that stretched beyond their local
communities to the larger realm of state government. Frontier residents
during the antebellum era could perhaps express their allegiance to local
institutions through the “civic grammar” and “fiscal syntax” of navigat-
ing complex local taxes,
41
but in a modern urban-industrial age citizens
need to view their responsibilities and obligations more broadly. Fostering
the legitimacy of a state-level income tax, along with the centralization
of fiscal administration, was an important step in forging this new civic
identity. In coming years, the federal constitutional amendment permit-
ting progressive income taxes and the subsequent federal tax laws would
replicate this process of reconfiguring citizenship on a national scale.
The 1911 Income Tax and a Constitutional Challenge
As Haugen was attempting to convince Wisconsinites like Wilson of the
virtues of a centrally administered income tax, the legislature was draft-
ing the details of the new statute. Although Haugen and Adams were
early proponents of the income tax, by 1911 they had been displaced in
the legislative drafting process by two other experts: the economist D. O.
Kinsman and Charles McCarthy, the head of the state legislative refer-
ence library and the fountainhead of many of Wisconsin’s progressive
reforms. During the legislative discussions over the bill, commercial
interests opposed an income tax, particularly one levied on corporate
income.
42
McCarthy appeared to be unconcerned with the arguments
that a corporate income tax might adversely affect Wisconsin’s economic
prospects by driving capital investments to neighboring states. By con-
trast, Adams and other tax experts seemed to believe that the spread of
state income taxes was inevitable, and that any short-term comparative
disadvantage that Wisconsin faced in attracting capital would soon be
mitigated in the long run when other states followed its lead.
43
The concern over corporate income taxes in a federalist system was
not the only issue that divided McCarthy from other supporters of the
income tax. Unlike Adams and Haugen, who believed that a graduated
income tax could be a wholesale replacement for the property tax,
McCarthy and Kinsman maintained that because of revenue concerns
the state could not repeal the taxation of real property. If tax reform was
necessary to provide increased revenue for the growing social-welfare
state, eliminating all property taxes appeared to be too risky. McCarthy
proposed that the new income tax simply replace the personal property
component of the general property tax.
44
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The final version of the 1911 income tax reflected McCarthy’s
vision. With the support of Milwaukee’s Socialists, the enacted law had
a graduated rate structure that began at 1 percent for all incomes over
$1,000 and reached a maximum rate of 6 percent for incomes greater
than $12,000, ensuring that the levy would solely affect the state’s
wealthiest citizens. But more important, the income tax effectively
replaced only the taxation of personal property, leaving the levy on real
property intact. It did so by eliminating several types of intangible
personal property such as stocks and bonds from the tax rolls, and by
permitting taxpayers an “offset,” or credit, against their income tax
liability for any taxes paid on the remaining forms of taxable personal
property. Although lawmakers—fearful of losing too much revenue—
did not agree with the Adams and Haugen proposal to have the income
tax replace the entire property tax, they did adopt the administrative
changes that Adams and Haugen recommended. Indeed, nearly two-
thirds of the statute was dedicated to administrative changes. The new
law centralized the assessment process, taking it away from local officials
and placing it in the hands of professional experts supervised by the state
tax commission. These professionals were chosen not because of any
political associations but rather by their performance on rigorous civil
service exams, which tested financial and tax expertise. Even skeptical
political economists, who believed a federal income tax was more feasible
than a state levy, viewed the new Wisconsin law as “a revolution in
administrative methods.”
45
Reflecting on the early success of the new income tax, Wisconsin
reformers noted that one of the main reasons for the achievement was the
accompanying civil services reforms and the method of collecting tax
information at the source. “The greatest discovery of the Wisconsin
income tax is the non-political assessor of incomes,” Adams declared. This
ensured that the tax system contained a “set of officers not dependent for
the retention of their offices upon the favor of the people whom they
assess.” For Adams, such administrative reform marked a historical
moment in the development of American taxation. “The appointment of
a body of protected tax officials marks a new epoch in the fiscal history of
the state of Wisconsin, possibly in that of the United States,” Adams
concluded. “It is very largely their work that has made the income tax a
success.” The efficiency of income tax collections was facilitated further by
the tax commission’s subsequent adoption of regulations that required
parties paying salaries, dividends, and interest to provide the tax commis-
sion with information about the taxpayers receiving such income.
46
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This crude form of withholding underscored the importance of third-party
reporting for a quasi-voluntary system of tax compliance. With these
administrative changes, the Wisconsin income tax law became an effective
source of revenue, and soon became the model for several other states, and
the federal government when it enacted the first permanent national
income tax in 1913. Adams carried the message of administrative reform
with him to Washington when he became an adviser to the U.S. Treasury
Department during World War I.
47
Before Wisconsin could become a model for others, however, the
courts had to rule on the constitutionality of the new income tax
statute. Just months after it was enacted, lawyers for a Wisconsin realtor
contended that numerous provisions of the new law, including the
consolidation of administrative powers, violated the state constitution.
While the Wisconsin Supreme Court made quick work of this challenge,
its reasoning and dicta illustrated how the judiciary during this period
was willing to go beyond its traditional role of policing the boundaries
between permissible public and private action. Instead, the court took
this opportunity to explicate the democratic roots and comparative
context of the income tax.
48
In a unanimous decision upholding the statute, the court stated
that the substance of the new law signaled “a very important change in
the general taxation policy of the state.” The enactment of the 1911
law, coming on the heels of the 1908 state constitutional amendment,
reflected the popular support behind progressive income taxes. The new
law, wrote Chief Justice John B. Winslow on behalf of the court, “is but
the concrete embodiment of a popular sentiment which has been abroad
for some time.” More specifically, the court noted that the 1908 consti-
tutional amendment had explicitly paved the way for the graduated
income tax. This “change was ratified by the people at the general
election held in November 1908,” wrote Winslow, “and thus was clearly
expressed by both the legislature and the people the idea that some form
of general taxation in addition to or in place of property taxation might
well be adopted.”
49
As part of his general defense of the law, Winslow also noted the suc-
cessful comparative history of the income tax. Echoing comments made by
Governor Francis McGovern when he signed the bill,
50
the court confi-
dently claimed that “the income tax is no new and untried experiment in
the field of taxation.” Identifying the venerable tradition of income taxes
in “many of the civilized governments of the world” and among “twenty of
our own states,” as well as “for a brief period by the government of the
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United States,” the court concluded that “taxation should logically be
imposed according to ability to pay, rather than upon the mere possession
of property, which for various reasons may produce no revenue to the
owner.” Thus, in passing the new law, Winslow contended that “the legis-
lature is only adopting a scheme of taxation which has been approved for
many years by many of the most enlightened governments of the world,
and has the sanction of many thoughtful economists.”
51
The court’s spe-
cific references to the use of income taxes in “civilized” communities and
“enlightened governments” demonstrated how Wisconsin lawmakers in
the early twentieth century were cognizant of the broader global context in
which they operated. By creating a workable state income tax, they
believed that they were helping lead their state, and their nation, out of its
backward and uncivilized era and into a new period of economic and 
political development.
If tax reformers found some comfort in the court’s ruling on the
substance of the income tax, they were especially reassured by the judi-
cial evaluation of the administrative modifications. Pointing to particular
constitutional provisions that governed the election and appointment of
local officials, the taxpayers/plaintiffs claimed that the newly created
state powers of assessment violated “the constitutional guaranties of local
self-government.” In response, the court held that “the office of assessors
of income,” created by the new law, was neither a “county, city, town, or
village” office, nor was it an office “existing in substance at the time of
the adoption of the constitution, or essential to the existence or effi-
ciency of either of said municipal divisions of the state.” The court
concluded instead that the centralized administration of assessments was
“an entirely new office . . . whose election or appointment may be pro-
vided for in any way that the legislature may in its discretion direct.”
52
Many observers, including the staunchly anti–income tax Milwaukee
Sentinel, viewed the court’s deference to the legislature as the death knell
for the inchoate movement to repeal the income tax.
53
Conclusion
Within a decade of its initial enactment, the Wisconsin income tax had
achieved some important, albeit limited, success. Although it did not
completely eclipse the property tax as the state’s main source of revenue,
it did begin the incremental process of diminishing the reliance on an
obsolete system of taxing personal property. Perhaps more important, the
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administrative reforms enacted as part of the 1911 income tax law
dramatically changed the way Wisconsin managed the assessment and
collection of taxes. A process traditionally controlled by local politics
gradually came under the domain of a relatively autonomous group of
bureaucratic experts who could rely on an early form of information with-
holding to secure tax revenues. The building of administrative capacity
was thus a critical step in addressing the fiscal challenges of the time, in
forging a new form of citizen identity, and in laying the foundation for the
subsequent growth of the public sector.
Despite the overwhelming skepticism of many tax experts, reformers
in the Badger State were able to respond to the turn-of-the-century fiscal
challenges by overcoming the political, social, and institutional resistance
to reform. New political ideas and institutions thus mediated the broader
socioeconomic forces driving fiscal change. Although its achievement
may have precluded other, more radical fiscal reforms, the early success of
the income tax emboldened other activists and politicians at the state and
national level to pursue a similar set of fiscal changes. Indeed, reformers
throughout the country understood that modernizing the prevailing
system of taxation implicated broader transformations. Amending consti-
tutions, creating administrative capacity, and overcoming popular cultural
resistance to centralized authority were all necessary steps in the process
of building a new fiscal order.
Indiana University, Bloomington
Notes
1. H. S. Wilson to Nils P. Haugen, 1 September 1910, Box 56, Nils P. Haugen Papers,
The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison (SHSW).
2. Biennial Report of the Secretary of State of the State of Wisconsin, 1927–1928
(Madison, 1928); Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, ed. Susan
B. Carter et al. (New York, 2006), table Ea132–59, table Ea247–75, table Ea489–518.
3. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National
Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (New York, 1982); Clifton K. Yearley, The Money
Machines: The Breakdown and Reform of Government and Party Finance in the North,
1860–1920 (Albany, N.Y., 1970).
4. W. Elliot Brownlee, Progressivism and Economic Growth: The Wisconsin Income
Tax, 1911–1929 (Port Washington, N.Y., 1975); John D. Buenker, The History of
Wisconsin, Vol. IV, The Progressive Era, 1893–1914 (Madison, 1998); Robert C. Nesbit,
Wisconsin: A History (Madison, 1973); David P. Thelen, The New Citizenship: Origins of
Progressivism in Wisconsin, 1885–1900 (Columbia, Mo., 1972).
5. John O. Stark, “The Establishment of Wisconsin’s Income Tax,” Wisconsin
Magazine of History (Autumn 1987): 27–45; Stark, A History of the Property Tax and
110 FORGING FISCAL REFORM
Property Tax Relief in Wisconsin (Madison, 1992); Joseph A. Ranney, “Law and the
Progressive Era, Part 2: The Transformation of Wisconsin’s Tax System, 1887–1925,”
Wisconsin Lawyer 67 (August 1994): 22–25, 62–63.
6. R. Rudy Higgens-Evenson, The Price of Progress: Public Services, Taxation, and
the American Corporate State, 1877–1929 (Baltimore, 2003); Morton Keller, Regulating a
New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900–1933 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1990); Jon C. Teaford, The Rise of the States: Evolution of American State
Government (Baltimore, 2002); John Joseph Wallis, “American Government Finance in
the Long Run: 1790–1990,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (Winter 2000): 61–82;
Yearley, The Money Machines. On the importance of slavery to the early development of
the American property tax, see Robin L. Einhorn, American Taxation/American Slavery
(Chicago, 2006).
7. Lawrence Friedman, History of American Law (New York, 1974), 497. See also
Harry N. Scheiber, “The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public
Purpose in the State Courts,” Perspectives in American History 5 (1971): 400; James T.
Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and
American Thought, 1870–1920 (New York, 1986), 355.
8. Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877–1920 (New York, 1967); Samuel
P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism, 1885–1914 (Chicago, 1957); Louis Galambos, “The
Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History,” Business History
Review 44 (1970): 279–90.
9. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Report on the Manufacturers of the United States at
the Tenth Census, 1880 (Washington, D.C., 1991), 189, table IV; Statistical Abstract of the
U.S., 1921 (Washington, D.C., 1922), 253, table 161; Campbell Gibson, Population of the
100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1998),
37, 41, tables 11, 19.
10. Wallis, “American Government Finance,” 69–71; Thelen, New Citizenship,
30–31; Brownlee, Progressivism and Economic Growth, 45.
11. Higgens-Evenson, Price of Progress, chap. 2. In real terms, Wisconsin spent
approximately $1.34 per capita on common school spending in 1880 and $2.62 by 1900.
Ibid., 28, table 1.
12. Transportation spending in Wisconsin, which was nearly nonexistent in 1910,
had jumped to nearly 25 percent of total annual expenditures by 1920. Higgens-Evenson,
Price of Progress, fig. 5, appendix.
13. Estimates suggest that by 1902 property taxes accounted for 57 percent of all
state government revenues, and roughly 73 percent of all local revenues. Wallis,
“American government Finance,” 70.
14. Title XIII, chap. 48, sections 1034, 1036, 1052, Supplement to the Wisconsin
Statutes of 1898 (Chicago, 1906).
15. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American
Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the
Large Industrial Corporation in America (Princeton, 1997).
16. Wisconsin Tax Commission, Report of the Wisconsin State Tax Commission
(Madison, 1898), 109–10. The Wisconsin Commission also “found frequent instances of
an almost open and avowed practice of favoring particular interests and industries or
classes of property.” Ibid., 78.
17. Seligman, “The General Property Tax,” Political Science Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1890): 62.
18. F. W. von Cotzhausen, “A Graduated Income Tax,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 17
October 1904; in 1873, von Cotzhausen, as state senator, was one of the first government
officials to call for tax reform. Emanuel L. Philipp, Political Reform in Wisconsin: A
Historical Review of the Subjects of Primary Election, Taxation, and Railway Regulation
(Milwaukee, 1910), 107.
AJAY K. MEHROTRA 111
19. Charles J. Bullock, “The State Income Tax and the Classified Property Tax,” in
Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference under the Auspices of the National Tax
Association (New Haven, 1917), 369; Teaford, Rise of the States, 47–49.
20. Yearley, The Money Machines, xii–xv; Higgens-Evenson, Price of Progress,
13–14; Teaford, Rise of the States, 45–46.
21. Stark, History of the Property Tax, 8; Bullock, “State Income Tax and Classified
Property Tax,” 375; Teaford, Rise of the States, 46.
22. T. S. Adams, “The Significance of the Wisconsin Income Tax,” Political Science
Quarterly 28 (December 1913): 569–85, at 575.
23. Glenn Fisher, The Worst Tax? A History of the Property Tax in America
(Lawrence, Kans., 1996), chap. 4; Einhorn, American Taxation/American Slavery, 204.
24. Gail Radford, “From Municipal Socialism to Public Authorities: Institutional
Factors in the Shaping of American Public Enterprise,” Journal of American History 90,
no. 3 (2003): 863–90.
25. Wisconsin Constitution, Section 1, Article VIII.
26. Marsh v. Supervisors 42 Wis. 502 (1877); see also Hersey v. Board of Supervisors,
37 Wis. 75 (1875); Bradley v. Lincoln County, 60 Wis. 71 (1884).
27. Thelen, New Citizenship, 204–7, 288; Richard L. McCormick, “The Party
Period and Public Policy: An Exploratory Hypothesis,” Journal of American History 66
(1979): 279–98; Michael McGerr, The Decline of Popular Politics: The American North,
1865–1928 (New York, 1986). For an updated reassessment of the party period, see
Richard John, “Farewell to the ‘Party Period’: Political Economy in Nineteenth-Century
America,” Journal of Policy History 16, no. 2 (2004): 117–25.
28. Philipp, Political Reform in Wisconsin, 109–11; Kossuth Kent Kennan, “The
Wisconsin Income Tax,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 26, no. 1 (November 1911):
169–78; Wisconsin State Tax Commission, 1898 Report.
29. Nils P. Haugen, Pioneer and Political Reminiscences (Evansville, Wis., 1930);
Robert La Follette to Nils Haugen, 24 September 1911; Haugen to La Follette, 2
November 1911, Box 56, Haugen Papers, SHSW; Brownlee, Progressivism and Economic
Growth, 49–51; Buenker, History of Wisconsin, 442–43; Stuart D. Brandes, “ Nils P.
Haugen and the Wisconsin Progressive Movement” (Master’s thesis, University of
Wisconsin, 1965).
30. Charles McCarthy, The Wisconsin Idea (New York, 1912); Buenker, History of
Wisconsin, 573–77.
31. Fredrick C. Howe, Wisconsin, An Experiment in Democracy (New York, 1912),
133–39; Philipp, Political Reform in Wisconsin.
32. Wisconsin Constitution, Section 1, Article VIII.
33. T. S. Adams, “The Wisconsin Income Tax,” American Economic Review 1
(December 1911): 906–9, at 906. The amendment carried every county but one, and was
ratified by a vote of 85,696 to 37,729 in November 1908 (ibid.).
34. Buenker, History of Wisconsin, 488–89; Jack Stark, The Wisconsin State
Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn., 1997), 8.
35. “Praise Income Tax,” Milwaukee Journal, 24 May 1911; “Income Tax Hearing,”
(Milwaukee) Evening Wisconsin, 24 May 1911.
36. Wiebe, Search for Order; Eldon J. Eisenach, The Lost Promise of Progressivism
(Lawrence, Kans., 1994); Daniel T. Rodgers, “ In Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in
American History 10 (December 1982): 113–32.
37. In this sense, the tax experts employed by state tax commissions were similar
to the “mezzo-level” actors of national executive agencies. On the importance of mezzo-
level administrators, see Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy:
Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovations in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton,
2001), 18–25.
38. H. S. Wilson to Haugen, 24 July 1910, Box 56, Haugen Papers, SHSW.
112 FORGING FISCAL REFORM
39. Haugen to Wilson, 26 July 1910, Box 56, Haugen Papers, SHSW; “Income Tax
in Place of Personal Property Tax,” Milwaukee Free Press, 26 May 1910.
40. Haugen to Wilson, 26 July 1910, SHSW; Haugen, Pioneer and Political
Reminiscences, 158–59. On the transatlantic roots of American economic ideas during
this period, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age
(Cambridge, Mass., 1998), chap. 3.
41. Merle Curti, The Making of an American Community: A Case Study of
Democracy in a Frontier County (Stanford, 1959), 270.
42. Not all businesses opposed the income tax. Some saw it as an opportunity to
apply the efficiency of the business corporation to state and local governance. Higgens-
Evenson, Price of Progress.
43. Brownlee, Progressivism and Economic Growth, chap. 3; Buenker, History of
Wisconsin, 551–54; Stark, “Establishment of Wisconsin’s Income Tax.”
44. Ibid. Adams to Haugen, 24 December 1910; Adams to Haugen, 1 April 1910,
Box 56, Haugen Papers, SHSW; “ Genesis of Wisconsin’s Income Tax: An Interview with
D. O. Kinsman,” Wisconsin Magazine of History, September 1937, 4.
45. Wisconsin Session Laws (1911), Section 1087m-8(1) and (2), Chapter 658;
Kennan, “The Wisconsin Income Tax,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (1911); Seligman,
The Income Tax, 421; J. C. Stamp, “The Tax Experiment in Wisconsin,” Economic Journal
23, no. 89 (March 1913): 142–46.
46. T. S. Adams, “The Significance of the Wisconsin Income Tax,” 572; Kossuth
Kent Kennan, “The Wisconsin Income Tax,” Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 58 (March 1915): 65–76; Thomas E. Lyons, “The Wisconsin Income
Tax,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 58 (March 1915):
77–86.
47. Brownlee, Progressivism and Economic Growth, 49–50; Buenker, The History of
Wisconsin, 554; James K. Conant, Wisconsin Politics and Government: America’s Laboratory
of Democracy (Lincoln, Neb., 2006), 298; Clara Penniman, State Income Taxation
(Baltimore, 1980), table I, 2–3;
48. State ex rel. Bolens v. Frear; Winding v. Frear. The Court consolidated these two
cases as the Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456 (1911). “ Believes Income Tax Law Invalid,”
Milwaukee Sentinel, 16 November 1911; “Income Tax Law Is Argued” Milwaukee Free
Press, 21 November 1911.
49. Income Tax Cases, 504.
50. In signing the bill, Governor McGovern attached a lengthy memo that stated
in part that “the plan of adjusting public burdens according to ability has been in suc-
cessful operation for many years in Switzerland, Austria, France, England, Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and the German states.” “Governor Calls Income Tax Just,”
Milwaukee Sentinel, 14 July 1911.
51. Income Tax Cases, 505.
52. Ibid., 511.
53. “Income Tax Law Valid, Says Court ” Milwaukee Sentinel, 10 January 1912;
“Hold’s State’s Taxation Plan Revolutionized,” Milwaukee Free Press, 10 January 1912.
